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Abstract 
 
This article presents two of Foucault’s lesser known notions, “justice fonctionnelle" (func-
tional justice) and “stratégie du pourtour” (strategy of the perimeter), in order to interro-
gate the role of legislators in regard to the policing of political dissent. This article contains 
three parts. First, I present the two lesser known notions referred to above. Then, I provide 
my understanding of the role of law for Foucault. Finally, in the third part, I explain how a 
consensual relationship between the police and legislators is established. I present briefly 
the work of Avrom Sherr (1989) and outline the contents of a recent U.S. anti-protest law 
(H.R. 347, or "Anti-Occupy Wall Street Law") which gives the police greater powers to rede-
fine the legal nature of public space and to make arrests without having to show criminal 
intent (mens rea) on the part of protesters. My aim is to further think through the paradox 
that Foucault mentioned in his lectures on security societies: non-judicial methods used in 
security processes undermine the primacy of law but also lead to the overproduction of 
laws (inflation législative).  
 
Keywords: Foucault; functional justice; catch-all strategy;  spatial turn; police discretion; 
Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011 (HR 347); UK Public 
Order Act   
                                                   
1  This article is an extended version of the paper presented at the Foucault Circle 
16th annual meeting, Sydney, Australia, June 29-July 2, 2016. 
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Introduction 
The most recently published of Foucault’s various lectures focus on the justice system, laws 
and the emergence of a repressive apparatus (Théories et institutions pénales: 2015; La société 
punitive: 2013; Mal faire dire vrai. La fonction de l’aveu en justice: 2012). In this context, we 
might think that new debates on Foucault’s posture on law will emerge in order to extend 
the work previously done by Hunt & Wickham (1995), Rose & Valverde (1998) and Golder 
& Fitzpatrick (2009) on the role of laws in security societies and Foucault’s stance in regard 
to the politics of rights and the rule of law. In order to participate in those debates, I would 
like to review two of Foucault’s lesser known notions: "justice fonctionnelle" (functional 
justice) and "stratégie du pourtour" (strategy of the perimeter), which can help us better 
understand the dynamic which underpins the management of popular illegalism (like pro-
test), and also to see how this dynamic operates in today’s world. 
In a 1977 French television interview,2 Foucault states that the justice system has the 
task of making the police work: “Police is a normalization apparatus (instance de normali-
zation) which doesn’t have so much to apply law as to take action (intervene) in ways that 
require individuals to adopt normal behaviors.” In this regulatory perspective, “Justice has 
the function to record, in legal, ritual and official terms, those police controls of normaliza-
tion”. In other words, the justice system allows the police to manage conducts in ways that 
provide it with the proofs and confessions it needs to operate within the framework of rule 
of law and to impose its decisions upon Justice by meeting its procedural requirements. 
Two years after this television interview, in 1979, Foucault reacted to the arrest of 
non-violent demonstrators in Paris by publishing in Le Nouvel Observateur, (n° 759, May 28- 
June 3th, p. 57) a text titled La stratégie du pourtour3 [literally, "Strategy of the Perimeter"]. In 
this text, he denounces arbitrary police procedures that take the form of the police invoking 
existing law in order to create an ‘on the spot’ offence (délit) and offender (délinquant), and 
drawing into codes of law the terms it needs to justify the arrest of individuals for suspect-
ed behavior or petty infractions. When those situations happen, Foucault states, the police 
work simultaneously outside and within the rule of law, or more precisely, on the edge of 
it, as the title to his Nouvel Observateur article suggests. Indeed, stratégie du pourtour refers to 
the police capacity to determine permissible types of behavior and sanction persons who do 
not conform. But Foucault also draws attention, in his article, to the police’s will to dissuade 
protest by creating fear, which it accomplishes specifically through exerting pressures over 
individuals whom it believes need to be controlled. He notes that the convicted protesters 
                                                   
2  "Michel Foucault: la justice et la police", Television interview, April 25th, 1977, Antenne 2. Director: 
Serge Moati; Producers: Jack Lang, Serge Moati, Jean Denis Bredin: http://www.ina.fr/video/I06277669 
3  Michel Foucault. "La stratégie du pourtour", in Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988 (Paris: Gal-
limard, 2001b), 794-797. [An English translation is available as "The Catch-all Strategy", Inter-
national journal of the sociology of law16 (1988): 159-162. Translated by Neil Duxbury.] 
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from Paris received aggravated sentences, while the strikers from Longwy4 facing similar 
charges were discharged. The differential treatment reserved for Parisian strikers (repres-
sion) in contrast to the one reserved for the mining strikers in northern France (tolerance) 
led him to believe that penal justice was transforming itself into a ‘functional justice’: a jus-
tice of security and protection which had to manage society in order to detect what is dan-
gerous, and in turn effect its own dangers. ‘Functional justice’, he says “has the duty to 
promote the safety of a population rather than respect the legal subject”.5 La stratégie du 
pourtour thus underlines the arbitrary aspect of security procedures which apply selective 
sanctions to the detriment of citizens' basic, fundamental rights. Foucault claims that for the 
sake of ‘defending society’, the justice system gives the police the power to circumvent the 
rule of law and the power to transgress the limits of the law while still remaining within the 
scope of legality. 
 
What about the law makers’ role? 
Michel Foucault: la justice et la police and La stratégie du pourtour, recorded and written in the 
aftermath of the French ‘années de plomb’ [State-sponsored violence period], present Fou-
cault’s negative assessment of the police and his thoughts on the penal system considered 
as a consensual6 (and a submissive) apparatus. Nevertheless, those interviews he gave im-
mediately before and after Security, territory, population facilitate understanding of what 
Foucault had in mind when, in his 1978 lectures, he asserts that police reason tends to be 
generally accepted and adopted by various entities within security societies. As a matter of 
fact, those interviews imply a collaborative relation between entities within the justice ap-
                                                   
4 La stratégie du pourtour was written in the aftermath of a police brutality episode. 
On March 23th 1979, metalworkers from Longwy facing layoffs protested in Paris. Far-
left activists and agents provocateurs (possibly working at the behest of the C.G.T. or 
the Socialist Party) broke shop windows at Place de l’Opéra to discredit the demonstra-
tion lead by the C.F.D.T. (a rival trade union). In response to this act of vandalism, the 
police arrested plenty of non-violent demonstrators. 
5 “Une « justice fonctionnelle » [est] une justice de sécurité et de protection. Une justice qui, comme 
tant d’autres institutions, a à gérer une société, à détecter ce qui est périlleux pour elle, à l’altérer sur ses 
propres dangers. Une justice qui se donne pour tâche de veiller sur une population plutôt que de respec-
ter des sujets de droit.” (Stratégie, 797). 
 "[The] penal justice is gradually becoming a ‘functional justice’, a justice of security and of protec-
tion. A justice whose job it is, as with so many other institutions, to manage a [gérer] society, to detect that 
which is perilous to it, to alert it to its own dangers. A justice which devotes itself to the task of vigilance 
over the population rather than respecting certain aspects of law." ("The Catch-all Strategy", 161.) 
6 “De l’homme casqué et matraquant à celui qui juge en son âme et conscience, tout le monde, d’un 
mouvement solidaire, s’entend pour jouer un même rôle.” (Stratégie, 796). 
 "All, from the person with helmet and truncheon to the person guided in judgment by soul and 
conscience, conspire solidaristically to play the same role." ("The Catch-all Strategy", Ibid.) 
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paratus which discredits the ‘legalist scheme’ (according to which lawmakers define by law 
what should be forbidden, the police apply laws, and judges hand down a sentence that fits 
the crime and reflects the spirit of the law). If the police have the capacity to determine who 
will be brought to justice and ensure a sanction by extracting from the code of law what it 
needs according to evidence it can provide, then it is surely the linchpin within a heteroge-
neous collection of actors with the potential to foster illiberal (illegal) tactics through legal 
means. 
According to Foucault, the separation of accusation, prosecution, and sentencing is a 
fundamental principle of penal justice. “Prosecution and accusation should not be in the 
same hands,” he writes. “The entity that brings charges in a case shouldn’t have the task of 
establishing the facts.”7 Consequently, in a case involving obvious crimes, it should be up to 
judges from the Justice Minister (le Parquet) to provide evidence permitting the Court to 
rule on the culpability of the detainee. However, in reality, the police collected and present-
ed the evidence. The accuser (the police) therefore certifies the veracity of the charges, dis-
charging factually the judgment of a third party: “Evidence: police saw it and took it”,8 
Foucault says.  
Foucault’s view of the mechanics of the justice system is not meant to imply that the 
rule of law is nonexistent, that the police is a strictly repressive apparatus, or that judges 
(portrayed as servants of the police) are mere puppets. In fact, he indicates that judges can 
‘refuse to play the game’ by questioning the police’s evidence or the validity of the charges 
and thereby attributing to them a decision-making freedom. He suggests that the police, 
mandated to protect society from disorder, performs its duty according to its own plan with 
the assistance of partners from adjacent fields. Foucault states adamantly: “Justice has given 
the key to the penal system to the police.”9 
The mechanics of the justice system as Foucault presents them in La stratégie du pour-
tour rest on the collaborative (in)action of judges, state representatives (attorneys general/le 
Parquet), and law. This collaboration allows the police to work according to its wishes. That 
said, Foucault does not elaborate on precisely how legislators—as law-makers having 
adopted police reason—participate in ‘functional justice’ by, for example, providing legal 
tools that facilitate the police’s changing needs. Nor does he interrogate the ability of legis-
lators to embed powerful formalities in laws that are consistent with and in turn support 
                                                   
7  “Poursuite et infraction ne doivent jamais être entre les mêmes mains: celui qui 
soutient l’accusation ne saurait être lui-même chargé d’établir les faits.” (Stratégie, 795) 
 "one of the basic principles of penal law is that prosecution and investigation 
ought never to be placed in the same hands; those who bring the accusation should not 
themselves be responsible for establishing the facts." ("The Catch-all Strategy", Ibid.) 
8  “La preuve: la police l’a vu et l’a pris”. (Stratégie, Ibid.)  
 "Proof: they were seen and caught by the police." ("The Catch-all Strategy", Ibid.) 
9  Foucault, La justice et la police. 
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the evolution of police tactics. It seems to me that legislators are a spectral figure standing 
in the shadow of the police, a figure playing an essential role that has yet to be fully ac-
counted for. Such an accounting is necessary for a clear understanding of Foucault’s notion 
of functional justice. 
Beyond my scholarly desire to explore Foucault’s thoughts on the justice system, it 
seems important to understand the ins and outs of the apparatus undermining the process 
of perfecting democracy and the rule of law. Keeping in mind that Foucault's more ephem-
eral works can be used for contemporary critical engagement and that he tied the notion of 
‘functional justice’ to a police rationality which has the potential to be adopted and shared 
by the police’s partners, I would like to see how political representatives mandated to look 
after the interest of their constituents can be part of a flexible body of practices relying in 
part on arbitrary decisions. My goal is to show how politicians, as lawmakers, engage in 
‘functional justice’ in order to see how their engagement modifies police abilities to inter-
vene against dissenters. Consequently, my review of Foucault’s lesser known notions serves 
to highlight mutations of public order laws which are likely to affect the way dissenters can 
express their discontent in today’s democracies.     
By performing an analysis of law that “would turn away from the canonical texts 
and the privileged sites of legal reason, and turn towards the minor, the mundane, the grey, 
meticulous and detailed work of regulatory apparatuses,” we can reveal the participative 
role of legislators in ‘functional justice’ by highlighting the kind of powers of adjudication 
their laws give to police officers called to become little judges of conduct (Rose and 
Valverde, 546). The specific goal of my questioning is to see how lawmakers can modify 
legal codes in ways that support police management of protest in the light of its ‘spatial 
turn’ and in line with Foucault’s thoughts on the mechanics of the justice system circum-
venting the rule of law. In the following, I will first discuss Foucault’s stance on law. Then, I 
will present Avrom Sherr’s10 (1989) comparative work on the UK Public Order Act. His 
work analyses the law to identify minor amendments that have been made over time in 
order to interrogate lawmakers’ motivations and stances in relation to policing dissent; con-
sequently, it provides a framework for understanding legal paradigmatic shifts. Finally, I 
will scrutinize the ‘Anti-Occupy Wall Street Law’ in order to show how lexical modification 
can have a great impact on the legal status of protesters and considerably increase police 
powers.  
 
Foucault and the Law 
For Foucault, law once wielded by monarchs was at the very heart of sovereign practices. 
Law allowed the sovereign to impose its royal will, obtain privileges, and collect goods 
essential to sustaining itself as a juridical being. However, antimonarchist struggles, 
                                                   
10 Avrom Sherr. Freedom of Protest, Public Order and the Law, (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1989). 
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changing geopolitical realities, cameralism, and the growing needs of the population 
characteristic of the rise of biopower and its accompanying emphasis on protecting the 
population from the hazards of everyday life, marked a fundamental and permanent 
change in the field and role of law. With the rise of anti-Machiavellian governmentality, law 
became secondary to prophylactic and normalization measures.11 Foucault claims that a 
‘new art of governing’ focused on satisfying the needs of the population and the advent of 
normalized bodies decentralized the justice system; this in turn caused the decline of the 
politico-juridical matrix (matrice juridico-politique) of sovereignty. The receding of 
sovereignty in the face of biopower and normalization does not mean, however, that law 
moves aside or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that law works as 
a norm, and that judicial institutions more and more function on a continuum as part of a 
regulatory apparatus.12 
Foucault refutes the idea that judicial and police institutions are attempting to apply 
laws or ensure their enforcement. Those institutions have the task of adapting their 
decisions and modulating their sanctions in order to obtain behavioral inflections. Insofar 
as this is the case, they operate according to the primacy of order (primat de l’ordre) rather 
than the supremacy of law (primauté de la loi) and “[tend] less to punish offenses than to 
penalize behaviors.”13 Foucault asserts that legislation (which was originally intended to 
prohibit forbidden actions) has inherited over time the function of providing the necessary 
                                                   
11  “The inter-dependence of law and norm in societies where government takes the 
form of the calculated administration of life, may surprise those who think that Fou-
cault denied the role of law and legal mechanisms in the exercise of modern forms of 
power”. Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde. “Governed by Law?”, Social Legal Studies, 
7 issue 4 (1998): 542. 
12  “Je ne veux pas dire que la loi s’efface ou que les institutions de justice tendent à 
disparaître, mais que la loi fonctionne toujours davantage comme une norme, et que 
l’institution judiciaire s’intègre de plus en plus à un continuum d’appareils (médicaux, 
administratifs, etc.) dont les fonctions sont surtout régulatrices”. Michel Fou-
cault. Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir, (Paris: Gallimard, 1976):190. 
 "I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institu-
tions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a 
norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated in a continuum of 
apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part 
regulatory.”, The History of Sexuality. Volume I: Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990): 144. 
13  "Lemon and milk", in Power, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 
1997): 438.  
 “[à] sanctionner les infractions [qu’à] pénaliser les comportements”. Michel Foucault, “Le citron 
et le lait” in Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001a): 697. 
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latitude so certificatory measures can take place. That is why normalizing societies are 
characterized by a proliferation of laws and by-laws, or as he puts it, by a ‘legislative 
inflation’.14 From this perspective, it appears that police bodies can invoke legislation to 
bring individuals into a regime of popular illegalism (considering popular conducts 
through the prism of illegality) open to judicial sanction, if the need arises. 
Laws constitute for Foucault a juridical substrate that allows non-juridical activities. 
That said, it is important to bear in mind that law is not a mere weapon lying ready for 
powers to forge, implement, and enforce it.15 Foucault’s judicial realism posits law as a 
reversible and flexible tool, slipping from the hands of authorities to be turned against 
them. Against a static understanding of law, he claims: “My rights exist and Law respects 
me because I’m defending myself. Therefore, it’s the dynamic of defense which gives laws 
                                                   
14  “Les mécanismes de sécurité eux aussi sont fort anciens comme mécanismes. Je 
pourrais dire aussi, à l’inverse, que si l’on prend les mécanismes de sécurité tels qu’on 
essaie de les développer à l’époque contemporaine, il est absolument évident que ça ne 
constitue aucunement une mise entre parenthèses ou une annulation des structures ju-
ridico-légales ou des mécanismes disciplinaires. Au contraire, prenez par exemple ce 
qui se passe actuellement, toujours dans l’ordre pénal, dans cet ordre de sécurité. 
L’ensemble des mesures législatives, des décrets, des règlements, des circulaires qui 
permettent d’implanter des mécanismes de sécurité, cet ensemble est de plus en plus 
gigantesque. Après tout, le code légal sur le vol était relativement simple dans la tradi-
tion du Moyen Âge et de l’époque classique (…) tout l’ensemble législatif qui concerne 
ce qu’on appelle justement les mesures de sécurité, les surveillances des individus après 
l’institution : vous voyez qu’on a une véritable inflation légale, inflation du code juridi-
co-légal pour faire fonctionner ce système de sécurité.” Michel Foucault, Sécurité, terri-
toire, population, (Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, 2004a) 9. 
 “Mechanisms of security are also very old as mechanisms. Conversely, I could also say that if we 
take the mechanisms of security that some people are currently trying to develop, it is quite clear that this 
does not constitute any bracketing off or cancellation of juridico-legal structures or disciplinary mecha-
nisms. On the contrary, still in the penal domain, look at what is currently taking place in the domain of 
security for example. There is an increasingly huge set of legislative measures, decrees, regulations, and 
circulars that permit the deployment of these mechanisms of security. In comparison, in the tradition of 
the Middle Ages and the Classical age, the legal code concerning theft was very simple (…) the whole 
body of legislation regarding what are called, precisely, security measures, the supervision of individuals 
after they leave a penal institution, you can see that getting these systems of security to work involves a 
real inflation of the juridico-legal code.” Security, Territory, population, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham 
Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 7. 
15  “Foucault’s attitude towards the law was more radical, and more complex, than 
simply an assertion that it remained in place alongside the new powers he was describ-
ing”. Ben Golder & Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (New York: Routledge, 2009): 71. 
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and rights an indispensable value for ourselves. Right is nothing if it doesn’t emerge from a 
sparking defense; and only defense validly gives force to Law.”16 
In light of this, Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009) contend that law bears a ‘polyvalent 
vacuity,’ an ‘insubordinate openness’ that allows the justice system to avert sovereign 
determination.17  However, if law’s flexibility avoids its unequivocal use, we can suppose—
as I am endeavoring to do here—that law can be formulated in such a way that its 
appropriation, reinterpretation, or repeal in the name of fundamental rights may be 
difficult. At this point, we might therefore ask: How is it possible to formulate law in ways 
that both inhibit its misuse and retain its openness?  
The law guarantees common values and normative behaviors through the 
articulation of interdictions prohibiting certain activities. If social norms change, so will the 
law and its enforcement. Nevertheless, because some unwanted gestures may elude its 
scope, the law has to act as a reactive force capable of bringing back within the justice 
system reprehensible conducts that cannot be laid down accurately. This is why the need 
for resistance to unforeseen situations demands that laws include a prerogative aspect. For 
that matter, enunciation of an interdiction through legal dispositions (clauses ordering 
objects within a semantic field) is likely to be articulated in a certain manner to bring down 
elusive actions on the interdicted. Hence, the law does not so much take its strength from 
defined interdictions but through its ability to grasp unconsidered situations, to compete 
with evasive actions; law is both prohibitive and adaptive. Foucault shows, in La stratégie du 
pourtour, how a law condemning violent gestures (loi ‘anti-casseur’) can be called upon to 
charge innocent demonstrators with reprehensible actions. By according an irrevocable 
dimension to police statements, this law usefully provides a way to transform popular 
(mis)conducts into lawless actions.  
 In what follows, I will show how some public order laws are adapting to restrain 
evasive dissenting behaviors.  
 
                                                   
16  “[C’est] dans la mesure où je me défends que mes droits existent et que la loi me 
respecte. C’est donc avant tout la dynamique de la défense qui peut donner aux lois et 
aux droits une valeur pour nous indispensable. Le droit n’est rien s’il ne prend vie dans 
la défense qui le provoque; et seule la défense donne, valablement, force à la loi”. Mi-
chel Foucault, Jean Lapeyrie, Dominique Nocaudie, Henry Juramy, Christian Revon et 
Jacques Vergès, “« Se défendre »” (1979): http://www.cip-
idf.org/article.php3?id_article=6191. 
17  According to Golder and Fitzpatrick: “a polyvalent vacuity, an insubordinate 
openness, for the ‘strategic reversibility’ of Foucault’s law consists precisely in the fact 
that what makes it open to appropriation and domination simultaneously makes it 
open to a resignification and renewal that eludes the determination of a sovereign or a 
given regime of power.” (Foucault’s Law, 84).  
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Expanding the scope of police power in times of unrest 
Sociologists and social movement historians note that policing of public protest is marked 
by strategic permutations in which different models of demonstration management overlap 
and succeed one another. They indicate that the management of demonstration have taken 
a ‘spatial turn’ (Gillham, Edwards & Noakes: 2013; Zajko & Béland: 2008; Della Porta, Reiter 
& Peterson: 2006; Vitale: 2005; King: 2004). Contemporary tactics, particularly those used 
during anti-globalization events, tend to disperse demonstrators (through the use of repel-
lant agents, for example) and forbid unauthorized presence in sensitive areas (zoning). Is it 
possible that legislators, having adopted the police’s practical reason, have taken the same 
‘turn’ and consequently forged laws that assist the police in controlling undesirable indi-
viduals? If so, we should be able to identify cases in support of this hypothesis or, at least, 
cases that illustrate how laws can be amended in ways that increase police power to inter-
vene in and curtail public protest.  
In Freedom of Protest, Public Order and the Law, Avrom Sherr compares the UK Public 
Order Act of 1936 (POA1936, adopted to counter political extremism such as fascism by 
focusing on the symbolic aspects of protest, including flags, uniforms, and masks) and a 
reformed version of that law, the Public Order Act of 1986 (POA1986), enacted during the 
Thatcher era. His comparative analysis reveals a transformation in the spirit of the law by 
analyzing developments that occurred in the fifty years separating the two pieces of legisla-
tion. Far from seeing ‘progress,’ Sherr’s analysis shows that the reformed law is more prej-
udicial because its increases the number of spatial and administrative constraints and al-
lows police to take action merely on the basis of suspicion. It is helpful to know that the 
1936 POA distinguished between two types of activity: procession and assembly. Premised 
upon the view that a (dynamic) procession is more likely to generate disturbance because a 
convoy may create congestion, blockages, and delays (in contrast to a [static] gathering of 
people), the POA1936 focused on public roads as a source of movement and consequently 
imposed more constraints on the movement of motor vehicles. This legislation does not 
abolish the right to use public roads. It retains it, but only for the purposes of passage. 
Therefore, if a procession stopped or interrupted traffic, participants would be charged with 
trespassing. With respect to assembly, the 1936 law allowed the police to ban marches, but 
also required it to impose conditions that organizers must meet in order to receive authori-
zation to use public streets. Interestingly, this law does not forbid assembly or procession in 
rural areas. In contrast, the 1986 POA removes the distinction between procession and as-
sembly. Focusing on ‘any’ gathering ‘in open air of twenty persons or more’, the reformed 
law widens the spatial scope of policing. 
Sherr addresses how the 1986 law, while similar to its predecessor, expands police 
power by modifying the temporality of its intervention. Prior to the reform, police officers 
were required to witness a breach of peace in order to intervene. The reformed law removes 
this requirement, thereby giving the police more latitude in determining whether and how 
to act. “Previously, public gatherings could take place and the police would have to wait to 
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see whether any breach of peace or obstruction of the highway had occurred before they 
could intervene. Now a prior assessment can be made, and if a senior officer deems it to be 
necessary, s/he can impose conditions on a gathering under Section 14 of the Public Order 
Act 1986.”18 In other words, the police can intervene without waiting for an incident to oc-
cur. 
This preventive legislation tries to annihilate disturbance beforehand by encourag-
ing police judgment. However, to avoid arbitrary decisions, mistakes or blunders that may 
be committed by field officers, POA1986 keeps a 1936 disposition giving only chief officers 
the ability to decide if a protest is legal or not. Paradoxically, the law allows an anticipatory 
intervention but prohibits regular officers from acting on their own. Its goal is to prevent 
disturbance while protecting against police abuse resulting from an anticipated and unjusti-
fied intervention. The legislators working in 1986 seem aware that prevention carries an 
iatrogenic aspect, and they raise prescriptions to limit negative effects that may derive from 
security measures. Nonetheless, that does not restrain the new law to widen police discre-
tionary power. If the POA1936 allows police to intervene based on reasonable doubt, the 
POA1986 permits restrictive intervention when authorities presume malicious intent.19  
Sherr notes that previously, organizers had to give information in advance to the au-
thorities (names, date, location, point of departure, event duration, itinerary, etc.), which 
                                                   
18  Sherr, 68. 
19  “The main structure of provisions remains the same. The senior police officer 
must have ‘regard to the time or place at which and the circumstances in which any 
public procession is being held or is intended to be held and to its route and proposed 
route’. There are minor variations of the wording, but the same issues are to be taken 
into account by the senior police officer under both the old and new statutes. The new 
Act, however, has a second dimension, having regard to those issues, in terms of the 
senior police officer’s assessment of the situation. Under the old legislation, where the 
chief officer (CPO) had ‘reasonable ground for apprehending that the procession may 
occasion serious public disorder’ the CPO could impose conditions on the procession. 
[…] The new legislation therefore allows the senior police officer to make conditions not 
only where that police officer ‘reasonably believes’ that serious disorder may occur, but 
also where serious damage to property may result or ‘serious disruption to the life of 
the community’. The latter could conceivably include any long term closing of a major 
road to traffic because of a public procession. To these are added the police officer’s rea-
sonable belief […] that the organizer’s purpose is ‘intimidation’. It is not clear what in-
timidation would mean in this context, since it is possible for any large public proces-
sion to be regarded as intimidating, and the line between urging or persuading and ‘the 
intimidation of others with a view of compelling them’ may be quite thin at times in the 
eyes of a senior police officer.” (Ibid. 70-71). 
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was used to impose conditions to control the progression of the event. The reformed law 
duplicates those requirements by specifying that information must be given ‘six clear days 
before the procession’ and by determining where organizers must do so (the notice must be 
delivered to a police station in the area in which the procession will start). The 1986 law also 
determines the kind of event subject to those regulatory constraints: “(a) to demonstrate 
support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons, (b) to 
publicize a cause or campaign, or (c) to mark or commemorate an event.”20 Therefore, those 
provisions forbid de facto spontaneous protest and impose a juridical responsibility on spe-
cific individuals: “An offense is committed by ‘each of the persons organizing’ a public pro-
cession if either notice is not given, or the date, time or route of actual procession differ 
from those actually specified in the notice.”21 However, the law does not define what kind 
of involvement is needed for a person to be held responsible, other than those related to the 
above. Considering this imprecision deplorable, Sherr claims that: “it might have been more 
sensible to have provided a wider definition in the Act of what ‘organizing’ might mean.”22 
Following Foucault’s thought on law, we might think that the law’s vagueness is a way to 
reinforce the police’s discretionary power.  
Sherr’s comparative analysis shows that something changed. The old legislation rec-
ognized the culpability of any individual violating imposed conditions, while the new one 
makes organizers accountable for any misconduct. In other words, the latest legislation 
predetermined those who would be accused if breaches take place. The law specifically 
made into arrestable offenses by statutory designation brawl, provocation, and harassment, 
as well as any action that may cause anxiety. The POA1986, which supports the institution-
alization of protest, sides with “victims” of demonstrations by considering disturbance or 
small offenses as a crime, and by acting against distress resulting from protest. The law, 
worries Sherr:  
 
tends to leave a great deal of subjectivity and discretion to a complainant and an attending of-
ficer. Behavior which may cause ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ near, e.g. a home for the aged, 
may be quite different from what may do so at a pop concert, and both of these may be quite dif-
ferent from what may cause reactions in a political meeting, demonstration or protest.23 
  
In short, POA1986 modifies the boundaries of the previous law by imposing new condi-
tions that widen the police’s ability to make decisions. It predetermines a judicial responsi-
bility on the part of organizers and penalizes petty misconducts. Written to fight hooligan-
ism, this legislation gives police agents the ability to arrest vociferous individuals by claim-
ing that their aggressive attitude is causing psychological suffering; the POA1986 can be 
                                                   
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid., 69. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid., 97. 
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used to ban demonstrations that some might find upsetting. Repression historian Robert 
Justin Goldstein writes:  
 
Before 1848 almost every European state imposed highly restrictive statutory or administrative 
restrictions on freedom of assembly and association […] Most European countries maintained 
harsh restrictions on such activities, either through explicit legislation or under the tradition of 
Roman Law, which regarded voluntary association for any purpose as suspect and required such 
group to obtain governmental authorization to be regarded as legal.24 
 
Sherr’s analysis thus shows that legal modifications appearing over time are constrained by 
a restrictive paradigm that is not about to be dismissed.  
  
Legislative precautions in the immediate aftermath of Occupy Wall Street 
Following Sherr’s example, I will analyze emblematic contemporary legislation to see how 
legislators offer a way to circumvent the rule of law: the Federal Restricted Buildings and 
Grounds Improvement Act of 2011 (H.R. 347),25 infamously known as the ‘Anti-Occupy Wall 
Street Law’ or the ‘Criminalizing Protest Bill’ by its detractors (even if the legislation was 
not originally inscribed on the US House of Representatives’ agenda to weaken the protest 
movement). This federal law is one of those used to punish dissent.26 
First of all, let us remember that the Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds 
Improvement Act was inscribed in the legislative agenda in January 2011 to revise the 2006 
dispositions which modified the original 1971 law. The revision of the act, which focuses on 
the protection of federal buildings, was planned before the occupation of Zuccotti Park 
(September 17, 2011); Occupy Wall Street and the legislative revision occurred at the same 
time by coincidence. That said, its inscription in the legislative agenda was a gift for those 
opposed to the protest movement, who now had a chance to modify the prescriptive 
substance of the previous law. At the end of the year, the bill was adopted unanimously by 
the Senate and almost unanimously by the House of Representatives (399/3). The bill was 
then approved by President Obama, who didn’t try to override by veto this bipartisan law. 
Adoption of this law says something about Washington’s antipathy towards OWS, but also 
about an existing desire to widen the protection of representatives in times of uncertainty—
the goal of this legislation is to restrict areas and sites where political officers and 
government dignitaries transit. 
                                                   
24  Robert Justin Goldstein. Political Repression in 19th Century Europe, (Totowa: 
Barnes and Nobles Books, 1983): 47. 
25  Government of the United States of America. “Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Im-
provement Act of 2011” (subsequently cited as HR347): 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr347/text 
26 25 In Washington DC, police used the DC’s anti-riot law (§ 22–1322) to arrest dissenters at Presi-
dent Trump’s inauguration ceremony. 
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The Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011 was reviewed to 
correct and simplify the original law that forbids unauthorized presence in restricted 
buildings and grounds, and not to create an emergency law empowering government to 
implement restrictive measures on protest. However, it was seen as such by critics and civil 
right activists.  
What does the law say to generate resentment? It states:  
 
(a) Whoever—(1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building or grounds 
without lawful authority to do so; (2) knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt 
the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, engages in disorderly 
or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any restricted building or grounds 
when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of 
Government business or official functions; (3) knowingly, and with the intent to impede 
or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, obstructs or 
impedes ingress or egress to or from any restricted building or grounds; or (4) knowingly 
engages in any act of physical violence against any person or property in any restricted 
building or grounds; or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished.27 
 
The punishment for a violation is: “(1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more 
than 10 years, or both, if— (A) the person, during and in relation to the offense, uses or 
carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm;” or ‘‘(B) the offense results in significant 
bodily injury [and] (2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or 
both, in any other case.”28 The law precisely designates what the term ‘restricted buildings 
or grounds’ means:   
 
(A) the White House or its grounds, or the Vice President’s official residence or its grounds; (B) a 
building or grounds where the President or other person protected by the Secret Service is or will 
be temporarily visiting; or (C) a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction with an event 
designated as a special event of national significance.29  
 
Also made clear is the meaning of the term ‘other person protected by the Secret Service’: 
“any person whom the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect (…) under 
section 3056 of this title or by Presidential memorandum, when such person has not 
declined such protection.”30 
It is important to bear in mind that this legislation doesn’t create any ‘new crime.’ It 
reaffirms the restrictions of existing laws which sanction disorder and considers 
unauthorized entry and interruption of governmental activities as offenses. (Scaling the 
                                                   
27  USA Government, H.R. 347 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. 
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White House fence or conducting a protest action on the steps of the Supreme Court of the 
United States are illegal). Let’s note, though, that while H.R. 347 does not create any ‘new 
crime’, it does place under federal jurisdiction those misdemeanors which were previously 
under municipal jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or dangerousness of the oppositional 
action. Consequently, trespassing, which may be punished by a light sentence, is now 
subject to more severe punishments. Under the reformed law, the “Standing Man” (Erdem 
Gündüz)31 from Taksim Place or Femen’s succinct action could face federal prosecution if 
they occur close to a government building. As it is, this legislation, which does not deny the 
right to assemble, allows more severe sanction of conduct that disturbs governmental 
administrative and official activities, or which occurs in, or near, sensitive areas. It is 
important to underscore that this law rests on the idea that symbolic spaces, persons, and 
activities are more likely to become a point of convergence for expressions of popular 
discontent. Thus, they must receive special protection. The law prohibits unauthorized 
presence near the president or ‘any other person’ protected by the Secret service, and 
forbids protest where important events (political conventions, Heads of State visits, 
international summits) take place; it thereby suppresses legal expression of grievances 
against those in power. 
 
A performative disposition 
To sum up, the H.R. 347 dispositions: 1. modify legal access to areas in accordance to 
dignitaries’ travel; 2. give restrictive powers to a secretive body (secret services); 3. ratify 
President Clinton’s decision to grant nationally important events a special status (Academy 
Awards, Super Bowl, Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade); and 4. allow prosecution of 
someone standing near a protected person. Those dispositions are changing the vocation of 
a location, modifying ex tempore the legal status of those who stand there. Therefore, if 
hypothetically the Occupy movement resurrects, occupants may face criminal charges if an 
administrative member of Brookfield Office Properties (owner of Zuccotti Park), having 
obtained protection from the Secret Service, would have the idea to visit the park. Similarly, 
Washington campers can face the same kind of charges if a senator, traveling from Capitol 
Hill to the headquarters of the Washington Post, decides to walk through McPherson Square. 
Even if those hypothetical situations do not occur, it is important to underline that the law 
sanctions those events by transforming the nature of places that hold them. By insisting on 
the site and the proximity (with protected persons or a restricted buildings) rather than on 
the nature of incriminating activities, the new dispositions facilitate the entry of individuals 
into a prejudicial legal universe.  
                                                   
31 Erdem Gündüz, a performance artist, protested against the Erdogan government 
in Taksim Square during the 2013-2014 protests in Turkey by standing still for hours. 
He became a symbol of the protest movement and was imitated by a great number of 
demonstrators. 
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It seems that the adoption of H.R. 347 was motivated by the sense that preventive 
inaccessibility is better than a reactive intervention that sanctions misconducts which are 
yet to happen. In regard to this, the ‘Anti-Occupy Wall Street Law’ has something in 
common with other legislation that annihilates a protest’s disruptive capacity without 
having to openly repudiate the right to protest. Examples include Quebec’s Law 12 (Bill 78) 
enacted during the 2012 student strike, which forbids the gathering of more than 50 persons 
and demonstration within 50 meters of an educational establishment, and the UK Serious 
Organized Crime and Prevention Act (2005), which closes the heart of London by forbidding 
protest near Westminster and Buckingham palaces. Let’s note that Quebec’s and Britain's 
spatial proscriptions are simultaneously “static” and “dynamic.” They both determine 
interdicted spaces (colleges and universities, House of Representatives, official residence, 
government buildings) and transform places which are free of restriction into unauthorized 
locations. The H.R. 347 carries “static” proscriptions as well (White-House, military bases, 
Camp David) but also gives a “sporadic” aspect to the “dynamic” proscriptions by linking 
them with the wanderings of important protected peoples, and the secret service’s planned 
itineraries and decisions. The Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 
2011 articulates a basic proscription allowing an infringement to be automatically 
established: it is forbidden to be in a restrictive area without proper authorization. Adding 
to that, the law specifies that governmental spaces (welfare bureaus, for example) are 
covered with the same legal prerogative as official buildings or sites (the Senate, Camp 
David). More importantly, the law also gives the secret services the ability to prohibit 
unwanted presence in unrestricted areas, spreading interdiction outside restrictive 
buildings and sites. Therefore, we can ask: Is it possible to incriminate individuals 
occupying Zuccotti Park or participating in protest activities in the adjacent streets 
(procession, leaflet distribution) close to the State of New York General Procurer Bureau, 
the Federal Hall, the New York Stock Exchange and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York? Yes, it’s possible. In fact, the dispositions of the law dispel doubts about the legality 
of protest activities by placing in the hands of secret services the capacity to decide whether 
any activity is legal or not.  
 
A significant lexical modification 
Detractors of the law claim that by withdrawing protestors from political or symbolic 
places, this legislation acts to obscure them from media attention without having to ban 
assembly or use other tactics that would attract public attention. More significantly, they 
reveal that this law rests on a seemingly unimportant, but powerful, lexical modification. 
Indeed, the original text of the Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 
2011 was adopted in 1971 (and revised a few times since then). Previous versions of the law 
contain the terms ‘willfully’ and ‘knowingly.’ The 2011 legislators chose to withdraw the 
word ‘willfully’ for the latest version. By doing so, police officers obtain the power to start 
criminal procedures without having to prove the deliberate action of an unauthorized 
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presence in a restricted area. By only keeping the term ‘knowingly’—which refers to the 
non-alienated mental condition of an individual who has entered a restricted area and the 
principle that no one should ignore the law—this legislation rests advantageously on a 
minimal criterion (having a sound mind) that could be use against unwanted individuals. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (which is opposed to the law) claims that:  
 
Most crimes require the government to prove a certain state of mind. Under the original 
language of the law, you had to act “willfully and knowingly” when committing the crime. In 
short, you had to know your conduct was illegal. Under H.R. 347, you will simply need to act 
“knowingly”, which here would mean that you know you're in a restricted area, but not 
necessarily that you're committing a crime.32 
 
The stratégie du pourtour emerging through the ‘anti-casseur’ law presented by Foucault 
eliminates the need to disclose evidence while giving an inviolable character to police 
statements. The strategy behind the ‘Anti-Occupy Wall Street Law’ rests on a different 
basis. It allows—as would any anti-riot legislation or public order act—the establishment of 
a breach ‘on the spot’ and the criminalization of unwanted individuals standing in 
restricted zones, public or private. But more importantly, as a result of the lexical 
modification of 2011, it compels police officers only to inform arrested persons that the site 
where they are standing bears a new legal status (so they will know)—therefore, they are in 
an infringement situation—without having to prove any desire to do wrong. By considering 
trespassing similarly to a parking infraction (there is no need for a traffic enforcement agent 
to consider the psychological state of mind of a ‘bad driver’ when issuing a parking fine), 
this law permits the recording and punishing of an offense without regard to the mental 
condition of the infringer or proof of criminal intention. With the elimination of the term 
"willfully" in 2011, mens rea disappears. 
The Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011 is not an 
emergency law suspending the Rule of Law stripping individuals of their fundamental 
rights. But it gives secret services the power to decide which places should be restricted and 
to call for the arrest of those within them. This law doesn’t place unwanted persons under a 
general state of exceptionalism, but creates, like other laws with spatial restrictions, partial 
                                                   
32  Gate Rottman, “How Big a Deal is H.R. 347, that 'Criminalizing Protest' Bill?" 
ACLU Blog: https://www.aclu.org/blog/how-big-deal-hr-347-criminalizing-protest-bill. 
Justin Amash (R) is one of the three members of Congress who voted against the bill 
[along with Paul Broun (R) and Keith Ellison (D)]. He justified his opposition in similar 
terms: “The bill expands current law to make it a crime to enter or remain in an area 
where an official is visiting even if the person does not know it's illegal to be in that area 
and has no reason to suspect it's illegal. (It expands the law by changing "willfully and 
knowingly" to just "knowingly" with respect to the mental state required to be charged 
with a crime”: https://www.facebook.com/repjustinamash/posts/318812154832493 .) 
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exceptions which disadvantage unwanted individuals. It seems reasonable to assume that 
the law’s dispositions effect a kind of sovereignty transfer by giving police the ability to 
makes decisions leading to judicial consequences. By considering non-violent spatial 
occupation as an infringement of common right, we may think (as Arendt would have 
done) that this law depoliticizes civil disobedience activities and re-hierarchizes Law by 
placing constitutional Right under common law. 
 
Conclusion 
Against a Marxist analysis (Sartre, Althusser) which would consider the police as a 
repressive apparatus protecting a bourgeois order, Foucault suggests that the modern state 
developed through integrating mechanisms of population control. Thereby, he refutes the 
idea that the State is a kind of “cold monster” or a “constable that would come to knock out 
people”,33 and claims instead that security societies are characterized by the replacement of 
a Machiavellian reason of state in favor of a regulatory raison policière – by a normalizing 
approach instead of a legalist one. This substitution allowed the police to become firsthand 
judicial actors to the detriment of members of the judiciary. This does not imply that the 
police are unable to use repressive methods, but rather it is a choice of tactics; the police 
have the freedom to decide how to control popular illegalism, however that may harm the 
principles of law. The police act, according to Foucault, not so much by sanctioning 
infractions but by preventing dangers through punishing conducts with the benediction of 
the justice system, which allows the police to maneuver according to an imperative to 
secure the public order.34 
                                                   
33  “L’État ce n’est pas un monstre froid, c’est le corrélatif d’une certaine manière de 
gouverner. Et le problème est de savoir comment se développe cette manière de gou-
verner […] et non de faire de [l’État], sur la scène d’un guignol, une sorte de gendarme 
qui viendrait assommer les différents personnages de l’histoire.” Michel Foucault. Nais-
sance de la biopolitique (Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, 2004): 7-8. 
 “The state is not a cold monster; it is the correlative of a particular way of gov-
erning. The problem is how this way of governing develops, what its history is, how it 
expands, how it contracts, how it is extended to a particular domain, and how it in-
vents, forms, and develops new practices. This is the problem, and not making [the 
state] a puppet show policeman overpowering the different figures of history”. Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008): 6. 
34 "C’est pour cause d’ordre qu’on décide de poursuivre ou de ne pas poursuivre. Pour cause 
d’ordre qu’on laisse à la police bride sur le cou. Pour cause d’ordre qu’on expulse ceux qui ne sont pas 
parfaitement « désirables »." ("Le citron et le lait", 697) 
 "For the sake of order that the police are given free rein; for the sake of order that those who 
aren’t perfectly "desirable" are expelled". ("Lemon and Milk", 438.) 
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Foucault’s functional justice assumes that the justice system (judges and general 
attorneys) benefits from a police capacity to provide necessary evidence required by 
procedural mechanisms. In exchange for the burden of policing society, functional justice 
also assumes that the police have received from its legal partners the latitude they need to 
operate. Following Foucault’s assumption, I hypothesize that legislators must play an active 
role within functional justice by creating helpful legal tools for the police. Law, as we all 
know, is an instrument used by suzerains, government bodies and citizens wishing to 
regiment an unwanted state, obtain legal legitimacy, or start a judicial procedure against 
prejudicial actions. It is a tool activated by an operative hoping to modify a current 
situation (e.g., financial retribution, condemnation, cessation of an activity). It is a 
prohibitive force that takes shape through its convening and is empowered by flexible 
dispositions permitting it to take on a number of activities. Sherr’s comparative analysis of 
public order acts and the overview of the “Anti-Occupy Wall Street Law” gave the 
opportunity to understand how legislators inlay elements allowing a stratégie du pourtour to 
emerge in legal texts. Foucault suggests that the police is a normative body mandated to 
regulate misconducts. We might want to add to his suggestion that legislators—when they 
‘play the game’—encourage the police, in times of dissent, to adopt a regal role and to 
exercise illiberal practices on the citizenry by providing the police with legal immunity. 
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